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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------00000---------RICHARD M. JOHNSTON, SHAUNA M.
JOHNSTON, THOMAS W. McDONALD,
and LOIS S. McDONJl.LD,
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.
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AUSTIN, INCOME REALTY AND
MORTGAGE, INC., a Utnh corporation, BOYD E. NELSON, BARBARA L. :
NELSON, JOHN FRANKS / DAVID J.
ISBELL and RUTH ANN ISBELL,

Case No.

19401

Defendants/Respondents.

----------00000---------NATURE OF THE CASE
This is Plaintiffs' appeal of an Order entered by the
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on August 19, 1983, denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing their
Complaint with prejudice, and granting Defendants' Nelson's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This is a case dealing with a Sellers' remedies under a
Uniform Real Estate Contract.

On September 15, 1982, Appellants,

the Sellers, filed a Complaint in Davis County, Utah, seeking to
foreclose as a mortgage Respondents'

(Austin's)

interests in

certain re<1l property because of a failure by Austins to timely

pay amounts due under the Contract.

The Trial Court denied

Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an Order of
foreclosure and granted Respondents Boyd E. and Barbara L.
Nelson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which resulted in
the dismissal of Appellants' Complaint.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the Trial Court's Orders
dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint and granting Respondents
Nelsons' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Appellants also

seek an Order granting Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment
allowing Appellants to foreclosure the Respondents'

interest ir.

the subject property, pursuant to the terms of the original
Uniform Real Estate Contract executed between Appellants and
Respondents Austins.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 15, 1979, Appellants Richard M. and Shauna M.
Johnston, and Thomas W. and Lois W. McDonald (hereinafter
referred to as "Sellers"), and Respondents Lloyd H. Austin and
his wife, Virginia Ann Austin (hereinafter referred to as
"Buyers"), executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract (hereina:'."ter
referred to as "Contract")

(R-7).

UndF>r the Contract, Sell_ers

agreed to sell to Buyers a four-plex apartment house known
South Main Street, North Salt Lake, Utah.

2
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Ruyers Austin agreed to pay Sellers the principal sum of
575

,ooo

payable with a $10, 000 down payment and the balance of

$65

,ooo

to be paid in monthly installl!lents of $579.02, which
pavments of interest and principal, in addition to

insurance nnd taxes.
A Notice of Interest of the Contract was recorded on January
15, 1979, in the Davis County Recorder's Office.

Thereafter

Austins solo their interest in the subject property which was,
then sold four more times to the other Respondents named above,
none of whom had any direct contractual relationship with
Appellants.

The Austins installment payment for August, 1980,

was not timely made because their check was dishonored due to
insufficient funds.

Appellants, at that time, advised

Respondents Austins that late payments would not be tolerated
(R-156,171).

Then, on September 4, 1980, an escrow agreement with Escrow
services, Inc., was entered into between the Buyers Austins and
their subpurchasers

(R-158,197).

The escrow agreement, among

other things, appointed Escrow Services as agent for Austins and
their subpuchasers for the payment of the Contract installments
to Appellant.

Appellants were not parties to this agreement nor

was the original contract in any way modified to permit a change
in

the ultimate responsibility for payments.
In June, 1982, Appellants received a check from Escrow

Services, Inc., for the June 15, 1982, payment.

3

This check was

returned due to insufficient funds

(R-222).

Appellant Richard M.

Johnston personally notified Virginia Ann Jlustin beforf> June lS,
1982, of the dishonored check (R-222).

Likewise, Appellants did

not receive the payment due them on July 15, 1982 (R-170).

on

four separate occasions between June 15, 1982, and July 19, 19Bi,
the Appellant, Richard M. Johnston, personally contacted Virginia
Ann Austin concerning the Austins failure to make the June 15 and
July 15 payments (R-222).

Finally, on July 19, 1982, Sellers

caused formal written notice of default and acceleration of the
Contract balance to be given Respondent Austins

(R-91.

On August

16, 1982, the Buyers Austins tendered a check for the past due
June and July payments, which tender was refused by Appellants
(R-24).

On September 15, 1982, Appellants instituted this actior.

by filing a Complaint in the District Court of Davis County
seeking foreclosure against the property pursuant to paragraph
16(C) of the Contract and §78-37-1 Utah Code Ann.

(1953).

All Respondents, except the Austins, are subpurchasPrs of
the property.

None of these Respondents have a direct

contractual relationship with the Appellnnts.

All Respondents

were personally served, except for Income Realty and Mortgage,
Inc., a Utah corporation, for which the registered agent could
not be found and, pursuant to statute, service was made upon the
Secretary of State of the State of Utah.

Respondents Income

Realty and Mortgage, Inc., David J. Isbell and Ruth Ann IEbell
failed to answer Appellants' Complaint and their default was
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entered (R-43,44,70).

Respondents Austins

(the original Buyers)

answered Appellants' Complaint pro se, but have not been
represented by counsel at any hearings on this matter nor have
thev appeared in person.

Pursuant to Appellants' Request for Admissions, the Respondents Austins admitted that Appellants notified them, as above
indicated, concerning the delinquencies of the June 15, 1982, and
July 19, 1982, installments before they received written notice
of default and acceleration (R-155).

Based upon the Austins

admissions and upon the Affidavit filed by Richard M. Johnston,
Appellants moved for a Summary Judgment against the Respondents
allowing for a foreclosure against the Respondents' interest in
the property.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEMAND FOR CURE RECEIVED BY THE BUYERS AND NOTICE
OF ACCELERATION COMPLIED WITH THE TERMS OF THE UNIFORM REAL
ESTATE CONTRACT AND WAS SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE SELLERS
TO FORECLOSE THE BUYERS' INTEFF.ST IN THE PROPERTY
The January 15, 1979, Uniform Real Estate Contract entered
into between Sellers and the Austins states as follows concerning
notice requirements:
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms
hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to
make any payment or payments when the same
become
due, or within thirty days thereafter, the Seller, at
his option,
shall have
the
following alternative
remedies .

5

c.

Seller shall have the right, at his option, and
upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire
unpaid balance hereunder at once due and payahle, and
may elect to treat this Contract as a note and
mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer subject thereto,
and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and have
the property sold and the proceeds applied to the
payment of the balance owing, including costs and
attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for
any deficiency which may remain.
(R-7)

The Buyers did not make the June 15, 1982, and the July 15, 1982,
payments as required by the Contract.

The check received for the

June 15, 1982, payment was returned due to insufficient funds.
Austins were given notice of this fact prior to June 15, 1982
(R-222).

On four separate occasions between June 15, 1982, and

July 19, 1982, Richard M. Johnston, one of the Sellers,
personally contacted Virginia Ann Austin, concerning the failure
to receive these payments (R-22?).

After the thirty day period

called for in the Contract, the Sellers gave written notice of
default and exercised their option under the Contract to
accelerate the balance of payments due and owing under the
Contract, and treat it as a note and mortgage (R-9).

On Aucrust

16, 1982, sixty-two days after the June 15, 1982, payment was
due, the Austins for the first time attempted to tender a check
for the past due June and July payments.

The Sellers returned

the tendered check and indicated to the Austins that they were
continuing to declare the entire unpaid balance due and payable
due to the delinquencv.

Under the terms of the Contract,

further was required by Appellants by way of notice.

The

wpellants gave the Austins ample time to cure the June 15
before written notice of acceleration was given on July
,0,

!982.

The Austins had actual notice in excess of thirty days

Mfore the Appellants gave written notice of acceleration.

The

Austins had a contractual right to cure, within thirty days of
their default, but did not do so.

Furthermore, paragraph 17 of

the contract provides that time is of the essence in the
contract.

The Trial Court erred in its conclusion of law that

the tender on Auaust 16, 1982, was timely when it was, in fact,
sixt;·-two days late and after the Appellants had exercised their
optinn to accelerate the principal due under the Contract.
Not only <lid the Appellants comply with the requirements of
tlie Contract, but the Appellants went further and on five
occasions, before the written notice of July 19, 1982, gave
notice to the Austins that the June and July, 1982,
pavrnents had not been made

(P-722).

The Trial Court erred by

holding that written notice of non-payment and demand for payment
given before the Sellers could give written notice of
acceleration of the unpaid balance (P-223).
Utah cases dealing with

situations require that the

huver be given sufficient notice so that he will fully understand

what was being required of him to bring the contract current.
Crow v. Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249

(Utah, 1980),

t_his Court stated that:

provisions in the Uniform Peal Estate Contract are
se 1 f executing, and to enforce them, it requires
snrne affirmative act on the part of the Seller to

nClt
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In

notify the Buyer of what specific provision in the
Contract the Seller is proceeding under and state what
the Buyer must do to bring the Contract current.
Id.
at 1251. [Emphasis added]
It is undisputed that when the check for the June 15, 1982,
payment was returned due to insufficient funds, the Sellers gave
the Austins immediate notice of such (R-222).

It is also

undisputed that on four other occasions between June 15 and July
19 the Appellants gave Austins notice that they expected the June
15 and July 15, 1982, payments to be made and the defaults cured.
The Austins were allowed a period in excess of thirty days after
they received notice of their default to cure such default.

In

spite of that, they did not even attempt to cure their default
until after the notice of acceleration was sent to them.

No

allegation has been made by Austins that they were confused about
what was required to cure the defaults. The only defense which
Respondents have raised has been that the notice should have
in written form rather than in verbal form and this was raised
only by the Nelsons, the subpurchasers, not the original
purchasers (R-192).
It is clear that the Appellants acted affirmatively in this
case to notify the Buyers of their default.

The question befuR

this Court is whether or not the

action that was

taken by the Appellants, namely verbal notice on five separate
occasi.ons to the Austins within the thirty day grace period,
sufficient notice to allow the Appellants to exercise the
of declaring the entire unpaid balance accelerated under

8

paraqraph 16(C) of the Uniform Peal Estate Contract.

The Trial

rourt was clearly in error in its conclu!=<ion that the law
requires that a Seller give written notice to Buyer of its
oefault and that the only affirmative act that is satisfactory
unoer a Uniform Real Estate Contract is written notice before the
oeller can elect to accelerate the Contract balance.

Such an

error of law reouires a reversal by this Court.

POINT II
NOTICE OF DEFAULT NEED ONLY BE GIVEN TO THOSE
WITH WHOM THE SELLER IS IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
The Trial Court in granting Partial Summary Judgment against
the Appellants ern'!d in concluding as a matter of law that
written notice of default must be given by an original Seller to
each party claiming an interest in the property under the Uniform
Estate Contract (R-223).

Bv so ruling, the Trial Court

erroneously concluded that even though the Sellers were not in
privity of contract with

claiming an interest in the

subject property, they still should be required to give notice of
default to each of those individuals.
In the case of Lamont v. Evjen, 29 Ut.2d 266, 508 P.2d 532
11973), this Court in ruling on the adequacy of the seller's

notice, said that the seller "must give the purchaser notice of
'he default

Id. at 534.

[Emphasis added]

This Court then

from 52 Arn.Jur., Tender, §41, which deals with tender in
cnntractua.l situations,

9

. • . The debt does not become due on the mere defnult
in payment, but by affirmative action by which the
creditor makes it known to the debtor that he intends
to declare the whole debt due.
. . . Such acceleration
stipulations should be so construed, if possible anc1
consistent with the language employed, as to give the
protection intended thereby to both the debtor and the
creditor .
Id. at 534.
[Emphasis added]
In this case, the Respondents Austins, the original
purchasers sold their interest, under contract, to Income Fealty
and Mortgage, Inc., who then sold its interest by contract to
Respondents Nelsons.

The Nelsons in turn sold their interest,

under contract, to Respondent Franks who, in turn, sold his
interest to Respondents Isbells, the persons currently in
possession of the property.

Given those facts, the Trial Court

erroneously concluded that there was some contractual duty
imposed on Appellant to notify anyone who may have claimed an
interest in the property of the contractual default of the
Austins regardless of whether or not pri vi ty of contract existed.
This Court has not been faced with this particular issue,
but in a case very similar to the case at hand, the Supreme Court
of New Mexico in Campbell v. Kerr, 95 N.M. 73, 618 P.2d 17.37
(1980), reviewed a situation in which the original purchaser was
in default under a Peal Estate Contract with the original vendor.
That Court, upon reviewing the facts, stated:
We know of no affirmative duty placed upon the vendor
in this situation to attempt to
contact
subpurchasers.
We have stated that the vendee is
entitled
to
reasonable
notice
of
demand.
The
Samuells-Kerr contract provides for such reasonable
notice unambiguously, and it is our function to enforce
it as made.
Schaefer v. Hinkle, 93 N.M. 129, 579 P.2c

10

314
(1979).
Likewise, there is privity of
estate, but not privity of contract between a vendor
and subpurchasers. Ex parte Robinson, 244 Ala. 313, 13
so.2d 402 (1943); Geo. V. Clark Co. v. New York New
Haven and H. R. Co., 279 App.Div. 39, 197 N.Y.S.2d 721
(1951).
Stebnowski had no legal duty to notify
Campbell of his demand upon Kerr.
A subpurchaser of
land from a purchaser with notice of the terms of the
contract between the original vendor and the purchaser
takes the land subject to such terms.
Frye v.
Partridge, 82 Ill. 267 (1876).
We can see no
equities in Campbe 11' s
favor which would require
stebnowski to notify Campbell of her demands upon Kerr.
Id. at 1243.

The court, in Campbell, supra, applied elementary principles of
contract law and in so doing protected the rights of that seller
under the contract which the Trial Court in this case failed to
apply and in so doing violated and infringed upon the contract
rights of the Appellant. The Idaho Supreme Court has also
recognized these principles and stated that a Uniform Real Estate
Contract should be governed by contract principles and
consequently the terms of the contract should govern the
trnnsaction.
11977),

In Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Ida. 644, 570 P.2d 1334

the Court compared the three common devices used to

transfer interest in real property.

It stated:

An installment land sale contract is one of three
security devices generally used in credit transactions
in real estate and is, in essence, a hybrid composed of
property law concepts on the one hand and contract law
on the other.
While the transaction involves the
transfer of ownership of real property, it is governed
by the
terms of a contract in which vendor and
purchaser join.
The contract is frequently
called a "poor man's mortgage" because the vendor, as
with a mortgage, finances the purchaser's acquisition
of the property by accepting installment payment on the
purchase price over a period of years, but the
purchaser does not receive the benefit of those
remedial statutes protecting the right of mortgagors.
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The advantage to the purchaser is that he does not have
to procure the expensive (and sometimes unavailable)
institutional financing; the advantage to the vendor is
the theoretically simple procedure of terminating the
purchaser's
interest
in the event of default as
contrasted with
the expensive
and
time
consuming
mortgage
foreclosure
action,
with
its
right
of
redemption.
But when the purchaser is in
default, what is his interest and what are his rights
under the defaulted contract?
The parties to the
transaction chose the contract as the vehicle by which
the transfer of the property would be governed.
We
conclude,
therefore,
that
these
defaulting
purchasers had no right to specific performance of the
contract after the thirty day period had run and the
vendors had terminated the contract, nor did they have
an equitable right of redemption.
The rights of these
parties were defined by the contract
Id. at
1336, 1339.
[Emphasis added]
In this case, the Appellants chose to accelerate the balance
and declare it due and payable and treat the contract as a
mortgage as they were allowed to do under the Contract which is
certainly more preferable to declaring a forfeiture which was
also an option of the Appellants.
The Trial Court incorrectly attempted to give all
subpurchasers, who were not parties to the original contract,
additional protection above and beyond their rights to redeem
under the mortgage statutes.

Consequently,

it ignored the

contract and nullified the practical economic benefit of allowing
individuals to sell and purchase property on the basis of a
Uniform Real Estate Contract.

By this ruling, sellers would be

required to go to the extraordinary legal expense of purchasing
title report and determining all those who have an interest in
the property before it could make demand upon an original

12

J

purchasPr to remeay a default under the Contract.

This is

an error which requires reversal by this Court.

POINT III
PAYMENT TO AN ESCROW COMPANY, WHO WAS
NOT AN AGENT OF APPELLANTS, DID NOT
CONSTITUTE PAYMENT TO THF 11.PPELLANTS
The law is clear concerning what actions constitute payment
of a debt.

The Trial Court, however, erred in its ruling that

the action by Respondents Austins in this case was a valid
of the installment debt contained in the Uniform Real
Estate Contract.

Respondents Austins, and possibly other

subpurchasers from them, made arrangements with a company by the
name of Escrow Services, Inc., in which all payments by the
subpurchasers were to be made to Escrow Services, Inc., which
would then make payments to those individuals to whom payment was
due, including the Appellants

(R-221).

Appellants were not

parties to this arrangement.

The Austins allege that monies were

paid to Escrow Services, Inc., during the beginning of June,
1982, out of which Escrow Services, Inc., was to pay the amount

called for under the Contract to Appellants.

Escrow Services,

Inc., transmitted a check to the Appellants for the June 15,
1982, payment which was dishonored upon presentment for payment

due to insufficient funds.

It was upon this dishonorment of the

check that Appellants immediately notified the Austins that the
check for the June payment had been dishonored and that
Appellants expected payment of the June installment immediately.
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The Trial Court made a serious error in determining that th,
remittance of monies to Escrow Services, Inc. , by the Buyers w;is
a payment of their obligation to the Appellants.

The Trial Court

stated:
Defendants made their payments.
Now, its
unfortunate that Defendant
[sic] . or the Plaintiff
didn't get their payments.
We use escrow companies
constantly.
We ought to be able to rely on them, and
they are like everybody else.
They can have their
problems and did so in this case.
(R-258)
The law is very clear that this construction by the Trial
Court is erroneous.
rule is stated:

In 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Payment, §17, the followinc

"An obliger is bound to pay his obligee in

person or by agent, and does not discharge his obligation
by making all reasonable efforts to transmit to the obligee
amount due him".

It is clearly the law that the risk is placed

upon the obliger to make sure that the obligee, or Appellants in
this case, receive the monies that are due them under the
Contract.
In an analogous situation, transmittal of payment by mail
places the risk on the obliger and not the obligee.
Therefore, <leposi ting in the mail a letter containing
money and addressed to the obligee does not discharge
the obligation if the remittance is not received by the
obligee .
60 Am.Jur.2d, Payment, §17, page 622.
The Trial Court's ruling was also erroneous due to the fact
that the Respondents had never plead that the payment to Escrow
Services, Inc., was a sufficient payment of the debt.
A plea of payment to one other than the creditor is
insufficient, absent allegations that the pavee was the

14

creditor's agent, or is authorized to receive payment
on the creditor's behalf.
60 Am.Jur 2d, Payment, §118,
page 699.
Furthermore, 60 Am.Jur.2d, Payment, §72, states that:
To discharge an obligation, payment must be made to the
obligee himself or to some third person authorized to
receive it.
A payment to an unauthorized person does
not discharge the obligation; the debtor takes the risk
the payment will be applied by a third person on the
debt.
Id. at 659.
The contract in question requires that payment be made by the
Austins directly to the Appellants.

It does not authorize or

even contemplate that payment be made to any third person,
including Escrow Services, Inc.

Therefore, when the Austins

unilaterally chose to use a third person through whom to make the
contract payments, they likewise assumed all risks connected with
the third party not making the required payments.

This principle

has bPen used by this Court even in cases where it seems that
there are two innocent parties.
In G. Eugene England Foundation v. Smith's Food King #6, 542
P.2d 753 (Utah, 1975), this Court stated that where one of two
innocent parties must suffer a loss because of the misconduct of
a third party, the law generally leans towards placing the loss
upon the one who made the choice and created thf' circumstance out
0£ which thf' loss came about.

526 P.2d 1121

See also Valley Bank & Trust Co. v

(Utah, 1974); Hanson v. Beehive Securitv

Company, 14 Ut.2d 157, 380 P.2d 66

(1963); and Oklahoma

Publishing Co. v. Video Independent Theaters, Inc., 522 P.2d 1029
(Okla., 1974).
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The present case involves a contractual situation where
Austins were to make payments directly to the Appellants.

The

Austins took it upon themselves to use the services of Escrow
Services, Inc., to remit payment to Appellants.

Escrow Services,

Inc., thereafter, did not remit the funds to the Appellants aM,
consequently, placed the Austins in a position of default.
Appellants had no control over the actions of Escrow Services,
Inc.
In summary, the Trial Court erred in its ruling that payment
by Austins to Escrow Services, Inc., constituted payment to
Appellants under the terms of the Contract and in so doing it
unjustly violated the contractual rights of the Appellants as
created by the written words of the Contract.

POINT IV
THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO FORECLOSE
THE RESPONDENTS' INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
OF LAW
PROPERTY AS A
The following relevant facts are undisputed:
(1)

Th!' Austins did not timely make the June and July,

1982, payments;
(2)

Appellants gave notices of these defaults to the

Austins at least five times;
(3)

The Austins' default was not remedied within thP thift

day time period provided under the Contract;
(4)

Consequently, Appellants accelerated the balance

under the Contract; an<l
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Arpe

The accelerated balance has not been paid.

llants are therefore entitled to foreclose the Austins'

interest in the property as a matter of law.
This Court, on numerous occasions, has defined certain
rrinciples which are applicable to the situation when a vendor
chooses to exercise the foreclosure option under a Uniform Real
Estate Contract.

Foreclosure was upheld as an appropriate remedy

in American Savings and Loan Association v. Blonquist, 21 Ut.2d
239, 445 P.2d 1 (1968).

In Park Valley Corporation v. Bagley,

63s P.2d 65 (Utah, 1981), this Court stated that it was not up to
the court to rewrite a contract despite the effects of a poor
bargain.

The remedy outlined in paragraph 16(C) of the Uniform

Real Estate Contract provides a valid remedy which the parties
contracted for and which Appellants should not be denied.
Furthermore, the law is clear that a tender of arrearages is
not sufficient once the entire balance has been accelerated.

In

SS Arn.Jur.2d, Mortgage, §390, it states that: " . • . the exercise
of an option to accelerate a mortgage is not affected by

subsequent tender of arrears, even if such tender is made before
actual foreclosure of the mortgage".

Id. at 434.

It is also well settled in this jurisdiction that
acceleration clauses can be enforced in contractual
relationships.

In KIXX, Inc. v. Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.7d

1385 !Utah, 1980),

this Court stated that:

ThP
clauses in a neqotiable instrument and
other contr2cts will be enforced-in accordance with the
Aqreement of the parties . . . an exercise of an option
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within the terms of the contract cuts off the payer's
right to remedy the default.
Id. at 1388.
The Austins have failed to fulfill their obligations under
the Contract and are now in default to the Appellants.

The

Appellants properly exercised their option under the Contract to
accelerate the entire amount due and owing and to treat the
Contract as a note and mortgage.

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court erred in denying Appellants Motion for
Summary Judgment.

A Uniform Real Estate Contract does not

require that written notice of default and demand for cure is
required before an acceleration of the balance can occur.
Further, notice of default must only be given to the original
purchaser, not each and every person who may have or claim to
have an interest in the property.

Finally, checks which were

dishonored given by the Austins' escrow agent did not constitute
payment by the Austins under the Contract. The Trial Court's
orders granting the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment
should be reversed and Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment tc
foreclose the property should be granted and this matter should
be remanded for entry of a Decree of Foreclosure and a
determination of the amount of attorney's fees which the
Appellants are entitled.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

day of November, 1983.
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